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CIVIL PROCEDURE-WHEN A UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS HAS
PREDICTED THE COURSE OF STATE LAW ON A QUESTION OF FIRST
IMPRESSION IN A STATE WITHIN THAT CIRCUIT THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF OTHER CIRCUITS SHOULD
DEFER TO THAT HOLDING.
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. (2d Cir. 1981)
Before his death, Elvis Presley assigned exclusive ownership of all
rights to use his name and likeness for commercial gain to Boxcar Enter-
prises, Inc. (Boxcar).' On August 18, 1977, two days after Presley's
death, Boxcar granted a license to use these rights to Factors Etc., Inc.
(Factors).2 On August 19, 1977, Pro Arts, Inc. (Pro Arts), without
permission from Factors, published a poster which bore a photograph
of Presley.8
Claiming that by publishing the poster, Pro Arts infringed on its
exclusive right to merchandise Presley's name and image,4 Factors sought
and was granted a preliminary injunction in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York restraining Pro Arts from
manufacturing, distributing or selling the Presley poster.5 Applying
1. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
2. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). Boxcar Enterprises was a Tennessee corporation
formed and controlled by Presley and his manager, Colonel Tom Parker. 579
F.2d at 216-17. Elvis Presley died unexpectedly and his father, Vernon Presley,
was appointed executor of his estate. The agreement, signed by Vernon Pres-
ley and approved by Parker, provided that Boxcar was the sole and exclusive
owner of Elvis Presley's commercial rights, and sold to Factors an exclusive
license to exploit commercially the name and likeness of the entertainer. Id.
at 217.
3. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
The poster published by Pro Arts was entitled "IN MEMORY" and bore a
photograph of Presley and the dates "1935-1977." Id. at 1092. Pro Arts
p urchased the photograph which had been taken by a staff photographer
rom the Atlanta .Journal. Id. Co-defendant Stop and Shop Companies,
Inc. was one of Pro Arts' first customers and sold the poster in its New York
stores. Id. at 1092.
4. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
5. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288, 290 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). In both Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. and Factors Etc., Inc. v. Crea-
tive Card Co., the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York (Tenney, J.) granted a preliminary injunction restraining the manufac-
ture, distribution, or sale of any commercially exploited souvenir merchandise
bearing the name and likeness of the entertainer. Id. at 290; id. at 280.
The court isolated the defendant's tort as that of unfair competition.
Id. at 290. The court stated that consequently it was "free to apply the
rule that in unfair competition 'the wrong takes place . . . where the passing
(393)
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New York law,6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit determined that Presley's right of publicity survived his death,
affirmed the district court decision, and remanded the case for further
proceedings."
off occurs,' i.e., at the point of consumer purchase." Id. at 291. There-
fore, the court, sitting in diversity, applied the law of the state of New York.
Id.
The court pointed out that the right of publicity had been recognized as
distinct from the right of privacy by the United States Supreme Court in Zac-
chini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 444 F. Supp. at
283. In Zacchini, the only publicity right case to reach the Supreme Court, a
television station had broadcast plaintiff's "human cannonball" act in its en-
tirety. 433 U.S. at 564. The Court held that the state's interest in protecting an
individual's right to publicity of his theatrical act was closely analogous to
the state's interests in patent and copyright law. Id. at 573. The Court found
that all three interests focus on the right of the person to reap the financial
reward of his endeavors. Id.
Relying on this reasoning, the district court in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. at 288 held, inter alia, that a right of publicity "existed,
was a species of property inhering in Elvis Presley, was alienable, and because
it was exploited to the entertainer's financial advantage in life, passed like any
other intangible property at his death." Id. at 290. The court, in Factors, Etc.,
Inc. v. Creative Card Co., noted that:
[T]he instant action does not present the Presley name or his fact
[sic] enhancing a product-Presley is the product. Furthermore, it is
not unreasonable to conclude that Elvis Presley's act included the
totality of his persona-performance, image and name. At the very
least the Presley visage is obviously an aspect of the performer having
a high market value, as evidenced by the competition which has given
rise to this case.
Id. at 283 n.3. The district court noted that the Second Circuit was one of
the first to recognize the right of publicity arid its assignability in the case of
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). 444 F. Supp. at 283. The court
further supported its finding by citing recent decisions which determined the
right of publicity to be a species of property. Id. at 284. As a property right,
the court found that the right of publicity was descendible. Id., citing Price
v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
6. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
7. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 227 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). The court held, inter alia, that the right
of publicity survived the celebrity's death. 579 F.2d at 221. New York was
the first state to recognize the right of publicity, an exclusive right to the
pecuniary value of one's name and likeness, and its assignability. Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). The Haelan court noted that the right of
publicity was additional to, and independent from, the right of privacy, which
has been termed the right "to be let alone." 202 F.2d at 868. In New York
the right to privacy is protected by statute. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50, 51
(McKinney 1976). See Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890); Note, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 751
(1978). The author of the Note explains that the right to publicity originally
developed as an extension of the right to privacy. Id. at 752-53. Eventually
it became apparent that this body of law was not sufficient to protect the pe-
cuniary interest in a name or likeness. Id. at 754.
[VOL. 27: p. 393
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Contemporaneously with the New York suit, Factors was involved
in litigation in the Western District of Tennessee in the case of Memphis
Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc.8 Memphis Development
had announced its intention to sell statuettes of Presley and brought suit
to prevent Factors' interference with the promotion.9 Factors responded
with a request for a temporary injunction against the sale' 10 which was
granted by the United States District Court for the Western District
of Tennessee." Pursuant to its exercise of diversity jurisdiction, the
district court decided the case in accordance with Tennessee law.' 2
Finding no state statutory or decisional law on the issue,'8 the court
concluded that if Tennessee courts were to hear the case they would
recognize an inheritable and assignable right of publicity.' 4 On appeal,
The right of publicity was deemed to be a descendible property right in
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). For
a discussion of the right of publicity and its descendibility,.see Felcher &
Rubin, The Decendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial
Life After Death?, 89 YALE I.J. 1125 (1980).
8. 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), affd, 578 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir.
1978).
9. 441 F. Supp. at 1323-24. Memphis Development Foundation, a non-
profit corporation, announced its intention to sell the statuettes in order to
nance a statue of Presley which was to be erected in his home city of
Memphis. Id. at 1324.
10. Id. at 1331.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1329.
13. Id. at 1325. The court noted that there was a "relative paucity" of
reported decisions and no reported Tennessee case dealing with the issue. Id.
at 1325 & n.2.
14. Id. at 1330. The court made it clear that since there was no Tennes-
see state court decision on the issue of the survival after death of a right of
publicity, its task would be to "ascertain from all the available information,
the general or majority rule on the issue which would be considered to be
adopted by the highest court of [Tennessee] if the issue were before it.' Id.
at 1329, citing West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Carr v. American Universal Ins. Co., 341
F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1965); Werthan Bag Corp. v. Agnew, 202 F.2d 119 (6th
Cir. 1953).
The court decided that the recent authority, both judicial and scholarly,
had acknowledged or logically determined that the right of publicity should
be inheritable and assignable. 441 F. Supp. at 1330. The court noted that
Tennessee courts have been protective of intangible property rights in situa-
tions involving unauthorized use of a trade name and unlawful interference
with commercial good will. Id. at 1329. Finally, the court held that the
"correct and majority view, though there are few cases precisely in point, is
that enunciated in Factors v. Creative Card Co .... ." Id. at 1330, citing
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
The district court was able to cite one Tennessee case which recognized
a special property right in a name which was commercially used by a husband
during life and which inhered to his widow. 441 F. Supp. at 1330, citing
Robinson v. Robinson's, Inc., 9 Tenn. App. 103 (1929). The Memphis De-
velopment district court's issuance of the preliminary injunction was affirmed
1.981-82]
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however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re-
versed and remanded, holding that in Tennessee a right of publicity did
not survive death.' 5 Consequently, Factors' request for a preliminary
injunction was denied.'0
Subsequent to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Memphis Develop-
ment, Factors moved- for summary judgment in the New York litiga-
tion.' 7 Despite the Sixth Circuit's decision in Memphis Development,
the district court found that by virtue of its assigned right of publicity,
Factors possessed an enforceable property interest and awarded summary
in an unpublished opinion. Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors, Etc., Inc.,
578 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1978).
15. Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 358 (1980). The case-was heard by Weick and
Merritt, Circuit judges, and Cecil, Senior Circuit Judge. 616 F.2d at 957.
No mention was made of the Sixth Circuit's prior affirmation of the district
court's temporary injunction. See note 14 supra. See also Factors Etc., Inc.
v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1094 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The Sixth
Circuit noted that because the issue was one of first impression, the court would
review the question in light of "practical and policy considerations, the treat-
ment of other similar rights in our legal system, the relative weight of the
conflicting interests of the parties, and certain moral presuppositions concern-
ing death, privacy, inheritability, and economic opportunity." 616 F.2d at
958. The opinion relegated to a footnote the discussion of the recorded
cases which have characterized the right of publicity as an inheritable property
right. Id. at n.2. The court then discussed the psychological factors which
motivate people to achieve. Id. at 958-59. The court concluded that the
creative endeavors of individuals in our society would not be inspired by
making the right of publicity inheritable. Id. at 959. The Sixth Circuit
then stated that if the right of publicity were inheritable, "[a] whole set of
practical problems of judicial line-drawing would arise.... . Id. Analogizing
the right of publicity to the law of defamation for which there is no right
of action after death, the court summarized its position as follows:
Heretofore, the law has always thought that leaving a good name to
one's children is sufficient reward in itself for the individual, whether
famous or not. Commercialization of this virtue after death in the
hands of heirs is contrary to our legal tradition and somehow seems
contrary to the moral presupposition of our culture.
Id.
For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Memphis Development, see
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 7.
16. 616 F.2d at 960.
17. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Pro Arts argued that the New York court should reverse its initial position
that a right of publicity is inheritable and adopt the view espoused by the
Sixth Circuit. Id. at 1094. Pro Arts further contended that the opinion
of the Western District of Tennessee which was in accord with the Southern
District of New York's decision was "no longer entitled to be given any weight."
Id. The District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected Pro
Arts' position, noting that the Sixth Circuit had no way to determine the
predisposition of the Tennessee courts because the Tennessee courts had
not addressed the issue. Id. For a comparison of the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion in Memphis Development with the Second Circuit's first decision in Fac-
tors, see Felcher & Rubin, supra note 7, at 1126 n.7.
396
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judgment to Factors.' 8  The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed, 19 holding that where the pertinent court of
appeals has predicted the course of state law on a question of first
impression within a state within that circuit, the federal courts of other
circuits should defer to that holding. Factors.Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981).
in the landmark case of Eric Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,20 the
Supreme Court, reacting in part to the spreading practice of forum
shopping, overruled the century-old precedent of Swift v. Tyson,21 and
proclaimed that state substantive law must be followed by federal courts
sitting in diversity.2 2 Justice Brandeis relied on both the Rules of De-
cision Act 23 and constitutional doctrine 24 in declaring that there is no
18. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1093 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
19. 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981). The case was heard by Mansfield and
Newman, Circuit Judges, and Carter, District Judge (sitting by designation).
Judge Newman wrote the opinion for the majority. d. at 279. Judge Mans-
field filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 284.
20. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, the plaintiff was injured by a freight
train, while walking on a path which ran alongside the railroad tracks. Id.
at 818. The district court and court of appeals, applying federal common
law, had decided in favor of the plaintiff. Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co., 90 F.2d
603 (2d Cir. 1937), rev'd, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the district court, holding
that the district court must apply the common law of Pennsylvania. 304 U.S.
at 80.
21. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEOERAL CotMrTs
251-52 (3d ed. 1976).
22. 304 U.S. at 78. In its decision, the Supreme Court concluded that,
except where a matter is governed by the Federal Constitution or acts of
Congress, state law should be applied. Id. Justice Brandeis stated: "There
is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substan-
tive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their
nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.". Id.
Discussing the impact of the decision, Professor Wright states:
It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Erie decision.
It announces no technical doctrine of procedure or jurisdiction, but
goes to the heart of the relations between the federal government and
the states, and returns to the states a power that had for nearly a cen-
tury been exercised by the federal government.
C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 255.
23. 304 U.S. at 72. Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided "that
the laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes
of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States,
in cases where they apply." 1 Stat. 92 (1789). This act, the famous Rules
of Decision Act, is now codified virtually unchanged at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1948). C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 249-53.
The main dispute in the construction of the Act had centered around
whether the "law" it refers to includes decisions of state courts in addition
to state statutes. C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 249. From 1842 until -1938
5
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the federal courts followed the view, represented by Swift v. Tyson, that ex-
cept where state court opinions construed the state's constitution or statutes,
or where local matters were at issue, the federal courts were free to develop
their own common law when hearing diversity cases. See C. WRIGHT, supra note
21, at 250. In Swift v. Tyson, Justice Story, speaking for the Court, noted
that "[i]n the ordinary use of language it will hardly be contended that the
decisions of Courts constitute laws." 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
At the turn of the century the doctrine of Swift began to fall into disfavor,
reflecting changes in judicial philosophy, and the critical response to the
Court's decision in Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi-
cab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). In that case, a Kentucky corporation reincor-
porated in Tennessee in order to create diversity and avoid Kentucky state
law. C. WRIcHT, supra note 21, at 252. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON
THE CONFLICr OF LAWS 427 (1971). Discussing the practice of forum shopping
which became more and more common under Swift Professor Weintraub states:
Horrible examples began to accumulate in which a state rule,
applicable to an intrastate transaction, could be avoided by stepping
across the courthouse square into the federal court under the aegis of
diversity jurisdiction.
The situation was intolerable, as many recognized. The forum-
shopping involved was bad, but much worse, at the core of the prob-
lem was the fact that individuals, in their everyday activities and deal-
ings, were subjected to two inconsistent bodies of law. At the nadir
of Black and White Taxicab [276 U.S. 518], Tyson entered its last
decade. It was slain by the "sledgehammer" blows of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins.
id.'at 428-29, quoting Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: the Brooding
Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 295 (1946).
. In Erie, justice Brandeis stated, "the mischievous results of the [Swift
v. Tyson] doctrine had become apparent. . . . Swift v. Tyson introduced
grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens. It made rights en-
joyed under the unwritten 'general law' vary according to whether enforce-
ment was sought in the state or in the federal court; . . ." 304 U.S. at 74-75.
Jtstice Brandeis cited an article published by Professor Charles Warren, who
ad examined the recently discovered drafts of the Judiciary Act of 1789
which showed that Congress had intended federal courts to apply local court
decisions as well as statutes. Id. at 73 n.5, citing Warren, New Light on 'the
History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 51-52,
81-88, 108 (1923).
24. 304 U.S. at 79. justice Brandeis called the Swift v. Tyson doctrine "an
unconstitutional assumption of powers by the Courts of the United States which
no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to
correct." Id. at 79, quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Commenting on Justice Brandeis's constitutional argument, Professor Wen-
dell stated:
The part of the Constitution offended by Swift v. Tyson is the
Tenth Amendment which provides that all powers not given to the
federal government are reserved to the states or to the people. As the
power to bypass state law when deciding diversity cases is not spe-
cifically conferred upon the national judiciary, it is argued that local
law must necessarily be applied by national courts in appropriate cases.
Moreover, the Constitution recognizes the sovereignty of the states,
and an element of that sovereignty is the ability to proclaim and
control the content of state law. To permit the federal govern-
ment to undermine the power of the states in this regard, would be
to contradict the basic division of authority between States and Na-
tion made by the Constitution.
[VOL. 27: p. 393
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federal general common law. 2.5
In 1941, the Supreme Court extended the Erie doctrine further in
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Manufacturer Co., 26 where, in an effort to promote
uniform application of substantive law within a state, the Court held
that federal courts sitting in diversity must adhere to the conflict of
laws rules of the state in which they sit.27
Post-Erie courts have established certain principles for determining.
what constitutes the "laws of the several states" 28 which the Rules of
Decision Act, as interpreted by Erie, requires them to follow. 29 For
M. WENDELL, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 191 (1
AMS ed. 1968). For an exhaustive discussion of the constitutional basis of
Erie, see Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme 'Court and the Erie
Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187 (1957). See also Friendly, In
Praise of Erie-and the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383
(1964).
25. 304 U.S. at 78. For a discussion of the distinction between "federal
general common law" and "federal common law", see C.* WRIGHT, supra note
21, at 278-86. Professor Wright points out that when the Court stated that
there was no federal general common law, it was referring to the law which
governs decisions in which state law can be conclusive. Id. at 279. He
notes that even though there may be no "general" federal common law, there
has clearly developed a body of federal common law which governs in situa-
tions where it would be unsuitable to look to the law of a particular state. Id.,
citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92
(1938) (the Court relied on federal common law in determining whether
waters of an interstate stream had to be apportioned between two. states).
26. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
27.-Id. at 494. In Klaxon Justice Reed noted that the Court was of the,opinion that "the prohibition declared in Erie R. Co. v.. Tompkins. . . against
such independent determinations by the federal courts extends to the field of
conflict oflaws .... Otherwise the accident of diversity of citizenship would
constantly disturb equal administration of justice in co-ordinate state and fed-
eral courts sitting side by side." Id. at 496 (citation omitted). Accord, Day
&_ Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (the Court emphasized
that Klaxon was still good law). For a discussion of Klaxon, see R. WEIN-
TRAUB, supra note 23, at 431; C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 264-66.
In the opinion of some modern conflict-of-laws scholars the federal courts
are in a uniquely favorable position to develop a body of conflict-of-laws doc-
trine but are prevented from doing so by the Klaxon decision. C. WRIGHT,
supra note 21, at 266 (citations omitted). See also Carpenter, Pluralistic Leg-,
islative Jurisdiction: Plainti's Choice Under the Klaxon Rule,. 40 IND. LJ.
47 (1965). Mr. Carpenter criticizes Klaxon, asserting that while restricting
forum shopping within state boundaries, the Klaxon rule has promoted forum
shopping among federal courts where a choice of state law is open to the
plaintiff. Id. at 477. See generally Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal
System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963); Hart, The Relations between State and
Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954).
28. For a discussion of the Rules of Decision Act, see note 23 supra.
29. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 267. Professor Wright notes that
'"[ijn Erie Justice Brandeis said that the federal court was to apply state law
wether 'declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court.' The
Erie doctrine has advanced-or retrogressed-far beyond this comparatively
simple test." Id., quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
See Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent: H, 40 TEX. L.
7
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example, if the state's highest court has not ruled on a particular issue-
the federal court must consider intermediate state court decisions, unless.
there are persuasive indications that the highest court of the state would
decide otherwise.3 0 Where only a very old decision interpreting a par-
ticular issue of state law exists, the federal court is free to conclude that
the state supreme court would overturn the old law if the issue were
presently before it.s1
REv. 619 (1962). The author discusses the early development of the Erie
doctrine, and criticizes the effect of cases subsequent to Erie which mandated
that the outcome in the federal court mirror the probable outcome in the
state court. Id. at 630-31. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945). Boner believes that the effect of these cases is to "(nullify] pro tanto
the growth of a system of courts where the important principle is that all
should argue upon the same basis of due process and fair trial, not that all
should attain the same result." Boner, supra, at 631-32.
30. West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940). See Boner,
supra note 29. Ms. Boner states that the West case:
enunciated the doctrine in its accepted form: A federal court is not
free to reject a state rule on the ground that the highest state court
has not sanctioned it. The duty in every case is to ascertain 'from
all available data' what the state law is, rather than to apply an inde-
pendent rule. Opinions of lower courts are such data, and are not
to be disregarded unless other persuasive data indicate that the state
supreme court would do so.
Id. at 619-20 (citation omitted). Ms. Boner sees this mandate to consider all
available data as a disturbing development. Id. She pointed out that Justice
Brandeis pictured state law as proceeding from a decision of the highest court
of the state. Id. In her opinion, West and other subsequent Supreme Court
decisions have departed from this ideal and condone reliance on state court
dictum where no direct holding can be found. Id. at 620 & 622. She notes
that a decision should be based on stare decisis, not "stare dictis". Id. at
622, quoting Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 72 (1928)
(coining the phrase "stare dictis").
Ms. Boner also notes that the West acceptance of dictum increases the
opportunity for forum shopping since a litigant who can find favorable dictum
which is not contradicted by a direct holding of a higher court may exert every
effort to get his case into federal court where a careless phrase may be accepted
as binding. Boner, supra note 29, at 622-23. See also C. WRIGHT, supra note
21, at 267. The extent of deference to intermediate court decisions required
by the Supreme Court has varied widely. Id. Wright notes that a series of
decisions in the 1940's, of which Fidelity Union Trust v. Field, 311 U.S. 169
(1940), was the most notorious, required rigid compliance with any lower state
court decision. C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 267, citing Fidelity Union Trust
v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940). In Field, the New Jersey legislature passed a
law allowing the Totten trust, a vehicle by which a person can make a deposit
in a savings account for himself as trustee for another, and create a tentative
trust revocable before death. 311 U.S. at 174. Two decisions by the New
Jersey Court of Chancery ignored the statute and held that a Totten trust
was invalid. Id. at 175. The Third Circuit rendered a decision contrary to
the Court of Chancery on the basis of the New Jersey statute and the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the chancery court's opinion must be followed.
Id. at 177. The 'first case in which the Supreme Court retreated from the
rigidity of the Field doctrine was King v. Order of United Commercial Travel-
ers of Am., 333 U.S. 153 (1948). King involved the interpretation of South
Carolina law in the construction of the terms of an insurance policy. Id. at
154. It was held that an unreported decision of the South Carolina Court
[VOL. 27: p. 393N"
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At times, federal courts are called upon to decide issues of state
law which no court of the state has yet considered. 2 In order to avoid
guessing what the high court of the state would decide, a growing
number of states permit the certification of the novel state issue to the
state's highest court. 83 The United States Supreme Court expressed its
approval of the certification procedure in Lehman Brothers v. Schein.3'
of Common Pleas, which did not have precedential value in the state, and
which could be located only with great difficulty, was not controlling. Id. at
161. For a discussion of these decisions, see Friendly, supra note 24.
31. C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 269-90. Wright notes that this doctrine
was first hinted at in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S.
198 (1956). The Court was more explicit in Commissioner v. Estate
of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). Wright notes that after the decision
in Commissioner v. Bosch, a federal judge was no longer a "ventrilo-
quist's dummy" but instead was free, as is a state judge, to consider all 'data
in an effort to determine how the highest court of the state would decide the
issue. C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 269-70. Unless the federal judge is al-
lowed this freedom, the Erie doctrine would merely have substituted one kind
of forum shopping for another. Id. The lawyer who had a case which de-
pended on an old or discredited state decision "would have strong incentive
to maneuver the case into federal court, where, on the mechanical jurisprudence
that the Erie doctrine was once thought to require, the state decision could
not have been impeached." Id. at 270 (citation omitted).
32. IA J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcicE 0.309[2] (2d ed. 1981).
33. IA J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAmrrIcE 0.203[5] (2d ed. 1981). At least
nine states have authorized certification by statute or court rules. Id. Florida
was the first to do so. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West Supp. 1956).
Other states which have enacted the procedure include Colorado (CoLo' App.
R. 21.1 (1970)), Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57 (1964)),. Maryland
(MD. ANN. CODE, Art 26 § 161 (Supp. 1973)), Massachusetts (MASS. SuP. JuD.
CT. R. 3:21 (1973)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 480.061 (1971)), Montana
(MONT. SUP. CT. R. 1 (1973)), New Hampshire (N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 490(Supp. 1973)), and Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1601-1613 (West
(1962)). Certification is not available in Tennessee.
34. 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). Accord, Clay v. Sun. ins. Office Ltd.,' 363
U.S. 207, 212 (1960). In Lehman Bros. the Court vacated a Second Circuit
judgment to give the appellate court an opportunity to certify an issue to
the Florida Supreme Court. 416 U.S. at 390. In its opinion, the United
States Supreme Court stated that although certification, where available, was
not obligatory, "[i]t does, of course, in the long run save time, energy, and
resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism." Id. at 390-91.
Similarly, in Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952), Justice Frankfurter
pointed out that it was more desirable to have state courts authoritatively de-
cide novel issues of state law than to have federal courts render tentative
decisions on those issues. Id. at 413 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See also Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IOWA L. REv. 629
(1951). The author explained that his article was written to "illumine cer-
tification of questions of law, a procedural device which had . . . generally
escaped the attention of the legal profession," in hopes that "[i]f certifica
tion is to lose out in future procedural reforms it will be the result of a
well-considered choice and not by default." Id. at 629 (citations. omitted).
Professor Kurland was of the opinion that:
[the possibility] offering the greatest promise, is to have the federal
intermediate appellate court certify the troublesome question of state
law to the state high court for resolution. Such an opportunity has
been afforded the federal courts by the Florida legislature, although
9
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In jurisdictions where certification is unavailable, a federal court may,
under special circumstances, abstain from deciding the case until the
state law issue is resolved by the state courts.85 However, unlike certi-
fication, which provides for direct review of the state issue by the state
supreme court, abstention requires the litigation of the entire case in
the state courts.8
Where neither certification nor abstention are available, a federal
judge, when ruling on an unclear issue of state law, must attempt to
ascertain what state law would be if the issue were decided by the highest
state court.87  In this exposition of state law, the federal judge may
it appears not to have been utilized. The practice might be adopted
through congressional action without the necessity for state enabling
legislation. In this manner, the court best equipped to answer the
state law questions could do so in a definitive manner.
Kurland, supra note 24, at 214, citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West Supp.
1956); Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IowA L REV. 629, 643
(1951); H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 391-99 (1953). See also Boner, supra note 29. Ms. Boner endorsed a
system of certification, while not expressly mentioning certification:
If the Supreme Court's considered purpose is to promote uniform-
ity within each state, some method of securing decisive interpreta-
tions of state law seems necessary. The goal of uniformity is not
served by federal decisions based on forecast rather than precedent.
By its distortion [via post-Erie rulings] of the Erie decision into a
policy of uniformity, the Supreme Court has withdrawn from the
federal courts a part of their freedom to apply the traditional processes
of judicial decision. If they must fulfill completely their judicial
function in spite of this handicap, there should be some means of
reconciling the necessity for decisions with the absence of state prece-
dent.
Id. at 621.
35. C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 218. Speaking of the abstention doctrine,
Wright notes that since 1941 it has been recognized that there are circum-
stances under which a federal court may decline to proceed even though it hasjurisdiction. Id. Abstention is used to leave to the state the resolution of
unsettled questions of state law, and to avoid decision of a federal constitu-
tional question by disposing of the case on the basis of state law. Id. Wright
notes. that the price of abstention is high: "In a number of well-known cases
it has led to delays of many years before the case was finally decided on its
merits or limped to an inconclusive end." Id. at 220 (citations omitted). See
Ashman, Alfini & Shapiro, Federal Abstention: New Perspectives on its Current
Vitality, 46 Miss. L.J. 629 (1975).
36. C. WPuonT,,supra note 21, at 219.
37. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). The Court
held that a federal court cannot refuse to decide a case because it is difficult
to ascertain state law. Id. at 234. In Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir.
1945), the Seventh Circuit stated: "In the absence of a state court ruling our
duty is tolerably clear. It is to decide, not avoid, the question." Id. at 177.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this view in McNeese v. Board of Educ. for
Community Unit School Dist., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
Wright speculates that the recent burgeoning of the abstention doctrine
may cast some doubt on whether Meredith still represents the rule. C. WRXIGim,.
.upra note 21, at 270 n.29.
[VOL. 27: p. 39S.
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consider all relevant data.38
In the absence of a controlling state decision, interpretations of.
state law by district judges familiar with the locality have historically
been accorded great weight since they are usually members of the bar
of the state in question and have had more exposure to state law than
have the circuit court judges s9 Federal appellate courts have been
reluctant to substitute their own view of state law for the view of the
district courts. 40 Some circuit courts treat a district court's determina-
tion of state law as dispositive even if the appellate court believes the
state law to be otherwise. 41 However, prior to Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
38. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 270-71. The federal court may con-
sider the Restatements of Law, treatises, law review commentary, and the deci-
sions of the courts of other states. Id. See generally IA J. MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 0.309[2] (2d ed. 1981).
39. IA J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.309[2] (2d ed. 1981).
40. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956);
MacGregor v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 315 U.S. 280 (1942). In MacGregor,
the Supreme Court, having no state decision to look to, deferred to the trial
and appellate judges, stating that it would "leave undisturbed the interpretation
placed upon purely local law by a Michigan federal judge of long experience
and by three circuit judges whose circuit includes Michigan." Id. at 281. See
Kurland, note 24 supra, at 187. Professor Kurland suggests that the Supreme
Court's deference to the decisions of the lower federal courts is based on
considerations of judicial economy. Id. at 217.
41. C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 271. Professor Wright believes that these
circuits are treating the question of state law in the same way they would
treat a question of fact. Id., citing H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Wire Rope
Corp. of America, Inc., 367 F.2d 653, 662-63 (8th Cir. 1966) (where a 'trialjudge arrives at a permissible conclusion with respect to the law of his state,
the court of appeals must accept it as binding); Rudd-Melikian, Inc. v. Merritt,
282 F.2d 924, 929 (6th Cir. 1960) (in diversity cases where local law is uncer-
tain under state court rulings, if a federal judge has reached a permissible
conclusion upon a question of local law, the court of appeals should not re-
verse it, even if the court of appeals thinks the law is otherwise); Binkley
v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 471 F.2d 889, 891 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 877 (1974) (where there is no state law on a particular issue, a court of
appeals will accept the district court's determination, unless dearly erroneous).
Professor Wright notes that deference to the trial court's ruling has been
given even where the district judge was from another state, sitting by designa-
tion. C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 271 n.34, citing St. Paul Hosp. & Cas.
Co. v. Helsby, 304 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1962). See Lee Shops, Inc. v. Schatten-
Cypress Co., 350 F.2d 12 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 980 (1965). In
Lee Shops, the Sixth Circuit, citing Melikian, held that where no state case
dealing with the issue had been cited, and there was uncertainty regarding the
predisposition of state courts, the court of appeals had only to decide whether
the district judge reached a permissible conclusion in his determination of
local law. 350 F.2d at 17. But see Randolph v. New England Life Ins. Co.,
526 F.2d 1383 (6th Cir. 1975). In Randolph, the Sixth Circuit qualified its
earlier position, stating that even though that circuit gives "considerable
weight to the district judge's interpretation of state law," appellants "are en-
titled to a review of the trial court's determination of state law just as they
are any other legal question." Id. at 1385.
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit's view that a trial judge's conclusion regard-
ing the law of his state will be binding on appeal was changed in Luke v. Amer-
ican Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1973). Following the ration-
1981-82] .
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Arts, Inc., a court of appeals has never decided how much deference
should be accorded a decision made by the court of appeals of another
circuit on the law of a state within that other circuit.42
It was against this background that the Second Circuit reached its
decision in Factors. The majority stated that although the choice of law
issue had received no attention from the parties prior to the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Memphis Development,43 that issue now became
of paramount importance. 44 Applying a New York conflict of laws
analysis, the court rejected Factors' contention that New York sub-
stantive law was rightfully applied below, 45 and unanimously agreed
that Tennessee law should be applied to the case.46
Judge Newman, writing for the majority, identified the issue which
divided the court as whether deference should be accorded to the deter-
ale of the Sixth Circuit in Randolph, the Luke court stated that the legal effect
of this principle was to preclude appellate consideration of issues involving
significant questions. Id. at 1019. The Luke court then reversed the trialjudge's conclusion regarding state law but announced no general standard
regarding when reversal was permissible. Id. at 1019 and n.6. See generally
IA J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.309[2] nn.25-28 (2d ed. 1981). Professor
Moore notes that "some appellate courts-and we think erroneously so-will
not interfere with the trial court's interpretation of local law unless found to be
clearly erroneous." Id. at n.28. The Second Circuit is not among the
states which have discouraged appellate review of a district court judge's inter-
pretation of state law. Id.
42. 652 F.2d at 281. The court stated that no previous case had turned
on the issue of whether one court of appeals should defer to another circuit
regarding an issue of state law within that other circuit. Id. (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 280. For a discussion of Memphis Development, see notes 8-16
and accompanying text supra.
44. 652 F.2d at 281.
45. Id. The Second Circuit stated that the first time it heard the case
and affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction, the parties did not
raise the issue of the choice of law and the court assumed that the case was
to be decided using the law of New York, the place of the wrong. Id. at 280,
citing Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1978).
Factors contended that New York law was applicable as New York was the place
of the wrong since the posters were sold in the New York market. 652 F.2d
at 281. Factors contended that if a significant contacts test were applied in
determining the place of the wrong, the significant contacts of the dispute
would be considered to be in New York, since it was the location of the
poster's sale and a center of communications with an interest in protecting
the celebrity's right of publicity. Id.
46. 652 F.2d at 280-81. The court noted that Tennessee was the place of
Presley's domicile and the place where the Boxcar-Factors agreement was made.
Id. at 281. Moreover, the agreement provided that it was to be construed in
accordance with Tennessee law. Id. The court concluded that these factors
would persuade a New York court that Tennessee law was applicable. Id.
Reasoning that while a New York court might apply New York law to some
elements of the case, the Second Circuit felt "certain that Tennessee law
would be referred to in deciding whether Boxcar had a right of publicity in
Presley's name and likeness, after his death, that was capable of being con-
tracted for by Factors." Id., citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 147, Comment i at 440 (1971).
[VOL. 27: p. 393
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mination of Tennessee law made by the Sixth Circuit in Memphis
Development.47 The majority noted that appellate courts give con-
siderable weight to state law rulings made by district judges familiar
with local law.48 However, Judge Newman expressed surprise that
there had been no prior decisions regarding the deference to be ac-
corded a circuit court decision interpreting the law of a state within that
circuit.49
Judge Newman emphasized that the issue for the court was not
whether Tennessee should recognize in this case a descendible right of
publicity,50 but whether a decision of a court of appeals, interpreting
the law of a state within its circuit, should be regarded as authoritative
by another federal court.51
The majority sought in its decision to minimize the interference in
state judicial process created by conflicting federal court decisions inter-
preting state law.52 It theorized that recognizing the authoritativeness
of a decision on state law made by the court of appeals of the circuit
where the state is located would foster two desirable goals, the orderly
development of state law,53 and fairness to those subject to state law.54
47. 652 F.2d at 281. Judge Newman stated that the merits of the appeal
concerned whether there existed a descendible right of publicity but that the
"more esoteric question, apparently of first impression" concerned the defer-
ence which should be given to the Sixth Circuit's decision. Id. at 279.
48. Id. at 281. The court also noted that the Supreme Court had simi-
larly deferred to a panel of circuit judges whose circuit included the relevant
state. Id., citing MacGregor v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 315 U.S. 280 (1942).
See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
49. 652 F.2d at 281. The majority noted that the Eighth Circuit's view,
expressed in Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174, 1177 (8th Cir. 1969),
that "[f]ederal court decisions in diversity cases have no precedential value
as state law and only determine the issues between the parties" was labeled
erroneous by Professor Moore who observed that several circuits have relied
on their own prior rulings on state law as precedent. 652 F.2d at 281 n.4,
50. 652 F.2d at 282. Judge Newman stated that he would probably up-
hold a descendible right of publicity, were he serving on the Tennessee Supreme
Court, and perhaps if he served on the Sixth Circuit when Memphis Develop-
ment was decided. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The majority noted that except in jurisdictions permitting cer-
tification, a federal court's determination of state law could not be corrected
for the benefit of litigants in a particular case by a subsequent state decision,
and that this was a price which must be paid for the existence of diversity
jurisdiction. Id.
53. Id. The orderly development of state law would be enhanced, in the
majority's opinion, "because the state legislature will know that the decision
of the pertinent court of appeals will determine legal rights, unless super-
seded by a later state supreme court decision. This knowledge will focus state
legislative efforts on the appropriateness of a statutory change." Id.
54. Id. Fairness to the public, in the majority's opinion, would be pro-
moted by making it clear that there is a single authoritative answer to a par-
ticular state law issue rather than varying interpretations of the different courts
of appeals. Id. The majority added:
1981-82]
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The majority qualified its holding by stating that a court of appeals
would be obliged to disregard another circuit's ruling if it were clearly
contrary to state law.15Summarizing its position, the court declared that since no clear
basis in Tennessee law could be cited which would render the Sixth
Circuit's prediction incorrect, 56 Memphis Development would be recog-
nized as controlling authority on the issue of the descendibility of a
right of publicity.57 Accordingly, the court accepted the Sixth Circuit's
conclusion that death terminates publicity rights and reversed the de-
cision of the district court.58
Judge Mansfield filed a vigorous dissent in which he stated that he
saw no reason for the Second Circuit to blindly follow the Sixth Circuit's
decision. 59 He noted that Memphis Development was inconsistent with
nearly every case in which the issue had been decided, 60 and was contrary
Diversity jurisdiction, especially in its post-Erie incarnation, should
not create needless diversity in the exposition of state substantive law.
Even though the decision of the pertinent court of appeals may be
revised by a subsequent state supreme court ruling, a state court
will normally have the option of making such a ruling prospective
only, thereby protecting any rights bargained for in reliance on the
ruling of the pertinent court of appeals. That option would make
little sense if the authoritative state court ruling came after divergent
rulings had been made by several courts of appeals.
Id. at 283.
55. Id. The majority concluded that the holding of the pertinent court
of appeals would not be automatically binding upon federal courts of other
circuits. Id. The court stated that the "ultimate source" for state law is "the
constitution, statutes, or authoritative court decisions of the state." Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 283-84. The majority stated that since it disposed of the appeal
by "deferring as a matter of stare decisis to the Sixth Circuit's interpretation
of Tennessee law," it need not consider any other contentions of Pro Arts.
Id. at n.8. These contentions included, inter alia, the claim that the judgment
in Memphis Development collaterally estopped Factors from asserting a
descendible right of publicity, and that federal copyright law preempted ap-
plication of state law. Id.
59. Id. at 284 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield agreed with the
majority in Factors that the New York conflicts laws would call for the applica-
tion of Tennessee law to the question of the survivability of the right of
publicity. Id. However, he saw no more reason for the court to follow the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Memphis Development than to "defer to the deci-
sion of any other circuit with which [the Second Circuit] might, as has occurred
on numerous occasions, disagree or conflict." Id.
60. Id. at 284 and n.1 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield noted
that prior cases held that the right of publicity survives death. Id. at n.l
(Mansfield, J., dissenting), citing Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp.
426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp.
279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). Judge Mansfield also pointed out that the Sixth Circuit's
own prior ruling on the preliminary injunction issued by the district court
[VOL. 27: p. 893
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to the views of every scholarly commentator.61 judge Mansfield stated
that Memphis Development did not represent al interpretation of
Tennessee law by the Sixth Circuit but was merely a declaration of
what that court thought would be a good common law rule for
Tennessee.62
Judge Mansfield refuted the majority's notion that a court of ap-
peals has special familiarity with the law of a state within its circuit. 6-3
He reasoned that a court of appeals of a circuit in which several states
are located disposes of diversity appeals only as a small percentage of its
business. 64 In Memphis Development it was the district judge, whose
decision was reversed, who had superior knowledge of Tennessee law.65
The consistency achieved under the majority approach was labeled
fortuitous and arbitrary by Judge Mansfield. 66 He pointed out that if
Memphis Development had arisen in a circuit other than the Sixth Cir-
cuit, then clearly the Second Circuit would not have recognized the case
as authoritative.0 7 The lack of logic behind the majority's geographical
reasoning, according to Judge Mansfield, was further demonstrated by
the fact that if the Second Circuit, in its first Factors decision, had stated
that Tennessee would recognize a descendible right of publicity, the
Sixth Circuit or any other circuit would have been free to adopt a
contrary view.68 This would have created the very inconsistency the
majority sought to avoid. 9
It is submitted that the Factors court followed the holding of a
sister court of appeals which was no more qualified than the Second
in Memphis Development and the Second Circuit's first determination in Fac-
tors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. were among the opinions recognizing that the
right of publicity survived death. 652 F.2d at 284 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
61. 652 F.2d at 284 and n.2 (Mansfield, J., dissenting), citing, inter alia,
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 7; Comment, Transfer of the Right of Publicity:
Dracula's Progeny and Privacy's Stepchild, 22 U.C.LA. L REV. 1103 (1975);
Note, supra note 7.
62. 654 F.2d at 284 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
.63. Id. at 285 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
64. Id. Judge Mansfield noted that the Sixth Circuit encompasses seven
states. Of 1,823 appeals filed in 1980, only 11.6% were diversity suits and
those originated from all seven states. Id., citing statistics from 1980 Annual
Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Ta-
ble A-12.
65. 652 F.2d at 285 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield criticized
the Sixth Circuit for making no real effort to determine what other states the
Tennessee Courts tend to look to in deciding novel legal questions and for
seeking no guidance in analogous principles of Tennessee law. Id.
66. Id. at 286 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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Circuit to make new law in Tennessee. 70 The Second Circuit admittedly
did not agree with the Sixth Circuit's reasoning." The district court's
opinion, which was reversed by the Sixth Circuit and ignored by the
Second Circuit, was, in contrast, a considered examination of state law
by a judge familiar with the law of Tennessee.72 For an abstract concept
of consistency, the benefits of which are speculative, the Factors court
sacrificed the quality of justice available to the litigants.7
Admittedly, in some circumstances, federal deference in a Factors-
type situation may provide a small measure of predictability until the
high court of the state speaks on the issue. 74 However, the Factors court's
plan for consistency will work only in limited situations.70 A major
reason for the court's deference was the fact that the state was located
within the confines of the circuit court which made the initial decision.7 6
It is unclear how the Factors court would proceed when the initial
declaration of state law is made by a circuit court which does not
encompass that state, and the local circuit subsequently disagrees.77 As
the dissent recognized, the majority solution, if applied to some situa-
tions, may actually increase uncertainty regarding state law.78
Certification of the unclear issue to the state's highest court seems
to be the most logical solution to the uncertainty problem.79 Any state
legislature is free to enact a statutory system of certification.8 0  Un-
fortunately, where the procedure has been made available, it has not
enjoyed wide utilization by federal judges sensitive to the increased
expense and delay it imposes on those who choose to litigate in the
70. Id. at 281. For a discussion of the basis of the Sixth Circuit's decision
in Memphis Development, see note 15 supra. For a criticism of the Sixth
Circuit's reasoning in Memphis Development, see Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also Factors Etc., Inc.
v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d at 287 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield
considered the Sixth Circuit's determination that leaving a good name to one's
children is reward enough, to be "rather harsh on those who have invested
their efforts in their name, rather than in the stock market, and constitutes
a rather heavy burden on creativity." Id., citing Felcher & Rubin, supra note
7, at 1132. For a view which is sympathetic to that of Judge Mansfield, see
Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity
and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. Rav. 673, 677-82 (1981).
71. 652 F.2d at 282. For a statement of Judge Newman's position, see
note 52 supra.
72. Id. at 285 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 286 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
79. See note 36 supra.
80. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 226-27.
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federal forum. 1 In addition, certification presents constitutional diffi-
culties since state courts may be giving no more than advisory opinions.s '-
It seems that uncertainty regarding novel issues of state law is a price
which diversity jurisdiction will continue to exact.83
Factors will be controlling within the Second Circuit. s4 However,
the other circuits will be reluctant to relinquish their own ability to
decide novel issues of state law.85 Ironically, the decision could even
81. Id. at 226. In the view of one judge:
If there ever was a way in which to delay a case as it moves slowly
through the courts, in my opinion, it would be the very procedure
whereby at one stage the case comes to a halt in the federal system,
moves over into the state system to await docketing, briefing, hearing,
writing, filing of the opinion and petition for rehearing and then
moves back again into the system of origin to take its place on the
judicial conveyor for resumption of proceedings in tile federal system.
In re Elliot, 74 Wash. 2d 600, 640-41, 446 P.2d 347, 371 (1968) (Hale, J., dis-
senting).
82. C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 226.
83. For a discussion of problems inherent in ascertaining state law in
diversity cases, see Kurland, supra note 24, at 204. Professor Kurland noted
that:
Several mechanical solutions are possible to the problem of in-
equality resulting from the inferior capacity-power, not ability-of
federal courts to frame state law in diversity cases. The first is at
the same time the most desirable: abolition of diversity jurisdiction.
The second has already been rejected by the Court: the possibility
of a court's refraining from the exercise of jurisdiction in those cases
where it finds itself unable to ascertain accurately the law of the state
involved.
Id. at 213. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter attacked diversity jurisdiction
on all fronts and called for its abolition. Id. at 54-60 (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring). See generally Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Qual-
ity of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 317 (1967).
84. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 7-10. The Factors decision will not
be binding on other circuits but it will be controlling precedent on the dis-
trict courts of the Second Circuit. Id. But see S. MERMIN, LAW AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM, 244-68 (6th ed. 1978). Professor Mermin discusses the courts'
treatment of precedents, and discusses the considerable freedom courts have in
the use of precedent. Id.
85. See Boner, supra note 29, at 638. Ms. Boner discusses the typical reac-
tions of federal judges to the rigidity forced upon them by the increasing
stringency of the Erie doctrine, and quotes judges expressing their dissatisfac-
tion with the doctrine. Id. Soon after Erie was decided, Professor Corbin
wrote that a forum "must use its judicial brains, not a pair of scissors
and a paste pot. Our judicial process is not mere syllogistic deduction, except
at its worst. . . . Shall a litigant, by the accident of diversity of citizenship,
be deprived of the advantages of this judicial process?" Corbin, The Laws
of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 775 (1941). See also Clark, supra note
23. Judge Clark stated: "[W]e must act as a hollow sounding board, wooden
indeed, for any state judge who cares to express himself. . . . Why should
we abdicate our judicial functions and even prostitute our intellectual capaci-
ties." Id. at 290-91.
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create a new species of forum shopping, ,as parties choose or avoid the
Second Circuit, knowing that another circuit's exposition of state law
will be blindly upheld.
Lynne Heckert
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